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RECENT CASE NOTES
Admiralty - Wrongful Death Actions - Use of
State Substantive Law
Plaintiff's decedent drowned in navigable waters within a state's
territorial limits while engaging in repairing a federal dam. Plain-
tiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act,1
and alleged that the United States was liable under the state em-
ployers' liability law.' The district court and the court of appeals
refused to apply the state statute upon the theory that the standard
of care it required was higher than was required by federal maritime
law for negligence; hence, application of it to this maritime tort
would be unconstitutional.3 Held: A remedy for wrongful death
created by a state statute may be invoked to recover for a death
on navigable waters within a state's territorial limits, and the
measure of negligence is the standard of care imposed by state law,
rather than by federal maritime law.4 Hess v. United States, 361 U.S.
314 (1960).
Under the United States Constitution, the control of admiralty
is within the jurisdiction of the federal government,' but the Con-
stitution has been interpreted to permit concurrent jurisdiction of
federal and state governments in certain instances.! Accordingly,
states may supplement the maritime rules' by permitting recovery
in cases where maritime law provides no remedy.8 Moreover, states
may legislate freely on maritime problems of predominantly local
concern.' However, the federal maritime rule generally must be
applied to problems of national concern if there is a clear conflict
' 62 Stat. 933, 983 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1950).
'Ore. Rev. Stat. § 654.305 (rev. ed. 1953). This statute creates a right to recover for
death under certain circumstances, and requires an employer to use every device, care and
precaution practicable for the protection and safety of life and limb. The general wrongful
death statute of the state is Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.020 (rev. ed. 1953).
3 1958 Am. Mar. Cas. 660, 259 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1959).
' Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas, Brennan, J.J., concurring; Harlan, Frankfurther, Whit-
aker, J.J., dissenting. See also, Goett v. Union Carbide, Inc., 361 U.S. 340 (1960), decided
the same day as the principal case.
'U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Detroit Trust Co. v. The Barium, 293 U.S. 21 (1934);
Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); Robinson, Admiralty § 5 (1939).
' Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 5 1-17 (1957).7 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 201 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953).
' Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 6.
'Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S.
1 (1937) (states allowed to enforce local inspection laws despite federal legislation upon
the subject); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 19 U.S. (How.) 143 (1851) (local regulation
of pilots allowed despite federal legislation upon the subject).
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between substantive maritime law and state law.1" Thus, if a seaman
incurs a non-fatal injury within a state's navigable waters, the de-
fendant's duty is measured by federal maritime standards11 even
though the plaintiff pursues his right through a state created
remedy. 2
In admiralty," as at common law," no remedy for wrongful death
existed, on the theory that the action died with the person. How-
ever, admiralty courts have permitted the decedent's survivors to
resort to the state wrongful death statutes for recovery.1 The Su-
preme Court in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn" intimated that sub-
stantive maritime law was still the measure of the right to recover,
even though the action was brought under a state statute. However,
the majority of lower federal courts have held that both the right
and the remedy emit from the state; consequently, state law deter-
mines the duty of the defendant.' Conversely, one circuit has ruled
that the state wrongful death statute creates only the right of
action; recovery will still be determined by traditional maritime
principles." In O'Leary v. United States Lines Co.," the majority of
the court, relying upon the Hawn dictum, said maritime law must
measure the recovery, although a state-created right was involved.
The dissent in O'Leary thought the Hawn dictum referred only to
traditional maritime rights and since maritime law allowed no
"°Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (the state burden of proof
was in conflict with the maritime burden, and federal maritime law thus controlled); Davis
v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917); Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 6, at §§ 6-58 through 6-63. Comment, 50
Nw. U.L. Rev. 677 (1955).
" Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Pope & Tal-
bot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
2 According to admiralty usage, "right" is a well-founded claim, and "remedy" is the
means employed to enforce that claim. A "right" sanctioned by the maritime law may be
enforced through any appropriate common-law "remedy." Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S.
Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918). See Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 6, at §§ 6-58
through 6-63.
"aThe Alaska, 130 U.S. 201 (1889); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
"4Prosser, Torts § 105 (rev. ed. 1955).
5 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921). See The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398
(1907). Federal statutes now permit recovery for maritime wrongful death in certain areas:
The Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915) as amended 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 688
(1958); Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-768
(1958); Longshoremens' and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927),
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950 (1957).
"6346 U.S. 406 (1953). The Court said, at page 409, "Even if Hawn were seeking to
enforce a state-created remedy for this right, federal maritime law would be controlling."
'See Curtis v. A. Garcia Y Cia, 241 F.2d 30 (3rd Cir. 1957); Graham v. A. Lusi,
Ltd., 206 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953); Truelson v. Whitney & Bodden Shipping Co., 10
F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1926).
"O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., 215 F.2d 708 (1st Cir. 1954); See Comment,
35 B.U.L. Rev. 285 (1955).
"9Supra note 18.
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recovery for wrongful death, both the right and the remedy were
created by state law, and state substantive law should control them."
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has allowed state substantive law
to measure both the right and the remedy where the state wrongful
death statute incorporates the federal maritime standard of care."
In the principal case, the Court was confronted with a state
statute that exacts a greater duty of care from the defendant" than
does the maritime rule of negligence. The Court extends The
Tungus v. Skovgaard"4 principle of state law supremacy in wrongful
death actions by ruling that the state substantive law measures the
right and remedy of the parties, even though the defendant's
negligence is measured by the higher state standard." The Court
relied upon the general language used in The Tungus, which held
that the power of a state to create a recovery for wrongful death
includes the power to determine when recovery shall be permitted.
Reliance was also placed upon Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,' where
the Court expressly stated that the right of recovery in these
wrongful death actions was local in character. However, neither of
the state statutes invoked in these cases placed a heavier duty of
care upon the defendant, and there is no indication by the Court in
the instant case that the problem is local. The opinion of the Court
did not mention the Hawn case. The only limitation placed upon
this ruling was that a state statute might be so offensive to maritime
principles that admiralty courts would not enforce it." The opinion
of the Court was weakened considerably by the four concurring
justices, who were expressly dissatisfied with The Tungus rule, but
reserved their opinion on whether to overrule it." Two of the dis-
senting justices favored application of the state substantive law
only when it imposes no greater burden on the defendant than does
federal maritime law,'0 while the third justice would have used the
state law only as a remedial supplement to the federal maritime
20 See Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 6-61.
"The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); See United Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki,
358 U.S. 613 (1959).
"2Ore. Rev. Stat. § 654.305 (rev. ed. 1953).
" See, e.g., The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
'4358 U.S. 588 (1959).
"361 U.S. at 321.
"The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 594 (1959).
'7257 U.S. 233 (1921).
28 361 U.S. at 320.
29 Id. at 321, 322. These justices join in the opinion of the Court only because of a
desire to see The Tungus v. Skovgaard rule applied when it increases the defendant's burden,
just as when it lessens it.
"°Id. at 322, 338, 339.
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law."5 Thus, while the Court's opinion positively enunciated the
principle that state law controls both the rights and the remedies
of parties in wrongful death actions, as advocated by the dissenting
justice in the O'Leary case, the dissatisfaction of the majority of
the Court with this rule indicates the inadvisability of whole-
hearted reliance upon it.
The principal decision emphasizes a curious anomaly in maritime
law. If the injury is not fatal, the maritime law fully governs the
rights of the parties, although regarding fatal injuries, state
substantive law is the measure." Thus, common-law defenses may be
available in an area of maritime litigation."s In non-maritime litiga-
tion, the Erie Ry. rule4 generally allows state law to control, but
Erie is uniform in its non-uniformity, i.e., state substantive law
governs whether the injury is fatal or non-fatal. Fortunately, the
inconsistency evidenced by the instant opinion will have only
limited application, since many maritime wrongful death actions
are now governed by federal statutes." Although the Court did
intimate that there may be state wrongful death statutes that are
so offensive to maritime principles that an admiralty court would
not enforce them," it is difficult to imagine a wrongful death statute
demanding a higher duty of care than the instant one, short of
absolute liability. A federal rule for wrongful death actions in the
area of litigation involved in the principal case, whether court-
created or congressionally created, would eliminate the "fatal"
versus "non-fatal" anomaly, and align with the traditional mari-
time view of uniformity in matters of national concern.
Richard N. Countiss
Conflict of Laws - Due Process - In Personam
Jurisdiction
P, a Texas oil company, sold to D's predecessor in title, a non-
resident, a working interest in Texas oil leases and received payment
" Id. at 339.82 See 361 U.S. at 322, 323. Perhaps an even greater anomaly is that the situs of the
injury causes this to be maritime litigation, with the resulting application of principles
originally designed for seamen and maritime commerce, although neither party in this
case was a member of either category.
"3 Gilmore & Black, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 6-61.
3
4 Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648
(1952).
3 See note 15, supra. Under these statutes, seamen, longshoremen, and individuals killed
on these high seas have a wrongful death action.
32 361 U.S. at 320.
" See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 201 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953);
Note, 33 Temp. L.Q. 455 (1958).
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from him for his portion of expenses for maintenance and develop-
ment of the leased land. D, also a non-resident, acquired the oil lease
interest by means of a trustee's sale and suit in a Texas court appar-
ently to compel conveyance of this interest to him. Subsequently,
when D failed to respond to P's demands for D's portion of addi-
tional maintenance and development expenses, P instituted an in
personam action' in a Texas court to recover these expenses. D,
having been personally cited under rule 108, caused the suit to be
removed to a Federal District Court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. Held: A non-resident natural person whose only contact
with the forum is ownership of an interest in oil leases within the
forum cannot be subjected to in personam jurisdiction based upon
the minimum contacts theory without violating the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Roumel v. Drill Well Oil Co., 270 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1959).
Until 1878 federal and state courts, unhindered by constitutional
restrictions, utilized a liberal policy of permitting suits against non-
residents.' In that year the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff4 made
a fundamental change by limiting the jurisdiction' of state courts
in rendering in personam' judgments to actual physical power over
the defendant. Consequently, strictly in personam jurisdiction could
not be obtained over a non-resident by service of process outside the
forum." Even if a court attempted to assert authority, the judgment
rendered -would not be enforceable in other states because full faith
and credit' is inapplicable to judgments which fail to meet the re-
' Plaintiff also unsuccessfully asserted an in rem action. 270 F.2d at 553. There is no
mention in the opinion of an action quasi in rem.
'Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann., rule 108 (1955).
' See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289, 292 (1956).
495 U.S. 714 (1878).
'Although it had been asserted that the due process requirement was not the same for
judicial jurisdiction as opposed to "legislative jurisdiction," Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), the Court in Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) implied that the factors in that case which permitted judi-
cial jurisdiction also were sufficient to meet the requirements for legislative jurisdiction. See
Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 522, 567
(1956). In this Note, "jurisdiction" shall mean "judicial jurisdiction."
' This Note does not purport to deal with actions in rem, see 1 Ehrenzweig, Conflict of
Laws 80 (1959), or actions quasi in rem, id. at 99. However, at least one writer has es-
poused the idea that the mechanical distinctions between in rem and in personam should
be abolished in our present-day mobile society where property increasingly becomes in-
tangible and the fictional res correspondingly more nebulous. See Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657, 663 (1959).7 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
"U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
[Vol. 14
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quirements of the due process clause The rigidity of the Pennoyer
rule, which greatly emphasized both the principle of federalism" and
the fear of causing appreciable inconvenience to non-resident de-
fendants, 1 has resulted in a series of exceptions"2 to this absolute
pronouncement which has been made applicable to non-resident cor-
porations as well as non-resident individuals." As to individuals, the
major exception 4 was the widespread use of non-resident motorist
statutes.15 In regard to corporations, the Court successively accepted
and then rejected "implied consent,' "presence,' 1 7  and "doing
business"'" as tests to be met before permitting the state to exercise
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation.
' Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 734-35 (1878); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, the
legal principle primarily responsible for maintaining the restrictions on state judicial power
is that which prevents a state from exercising in personam authority over non-resident per-
sons-natural or corporation-when it has failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over them.
Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts over Non-Residents in Our Federal System, 43 Cor-
nell L.Q. 196, 197 (1957).
0 A salient feature of the federal system is the restriction on the states individually
against extensions of power into other states. Ibid.
"See, e.g., Restatement (second), Conflict of Laws § 84(d) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
l See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev.
569, 578 (1958).
"3 In fact, the jurisdictional basis as to corporations has been broadened by the Supreme
Court's increased willingness to concede their full "existence" in the forum state by a pro-
gressively liberal interpretation of the statutory requirement of "doing business." See Eh-
renzweig, Pennoyer is Dead - Long Live Pennoyer, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 285 (1958).
"4 Minor exceptions included the transient rule, even when the defendant's presence was
procured by the fraud or force of the plaintiff, e.g., Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 Fed. 700
(2d Cir. 1917); and voluntary submission, even though the defendant appeared for a pur-
pose other than to attack the jurisdiction of the court, e.g., Western Life Indem. Co. v.
Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
" From the doubtful premise that a state may preclude the use of its highways to non-
resident individuals, it was thought to follow that a state might condition the use of the
highways on receipt of consent to be sued in the state courts for any action arising out of
the use of the highways. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Scott, Jurisdic-
tion over Non-Resident Motorists, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1926).
1" The consent thesis rested on the proposition that since a foreign corporation could not
carry on business within a state without the permission of that state, the state could im-
pose as a condition of engaging in business within its borders a requirement that the cor-
poration appoint an agent to receive service of process within the state. Compare Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855) with St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350
(1882). The major defects of this doctrine were recognized in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 416 (1955).
"7Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); New Eng-
land Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138 (1884). The weakness of this theory
was exposed by Judge Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.
1930), and also in the International Shoe case, supra note 16.
"St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); see Rothschild, Jurisdiction of
Foreign Corporations in Personam, 17 Va. L. Rev. 129 (1930). In reality, the two major
theories ("consent" and "presence") merged into this third theory and consequently, the
International Shoe case, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), became the coup de grace for the "doing
business" theory also. Kurland, supra note 12, at 68. But see I Ehrenzweig, Conflict of
Laws 113 (1959) where it is stated that although the "doing business" test was "still ap-
parently assumed in the International Shoe case, it was soon abandoned in Travelers Health
Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950)."
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The actual dilemma underlying judicial efforts to formulate a
rationale for in personam jurisdiction lay in the fact that the doc-
trines were borrowed from laws relevant to wholly independent sover-
eignties rather than jurisdictions joined in a federation." Unfor-
tunately, International Shoe Co. v. Washington,"° which discarded the
above three tests (viz., implied consent, presence, and doing busi-
ness), served to destroy existent doctrine rather than to establish a
new criterion for the courts to follow. Nevertheless, International
Shoe is given credit for originating the minimum contacts doctrine,"'
which has been extended to permit a state to entertain proceedings
against a foreign corporation doing business within the state without
a license, even though the cause of action sought to be enforced did
not arise out of the corporation's activities within the state."2 When
the minimum contact doctrine was recently construed to encompass
a single transaction by mail,"3 it was not clear whether there could
ever be contact so slight as to constitute a denial of due process if
jurisdiction were asserted."4 The latest relevant Supreme Court deci-
sion, Hanson v. Denckla, s emphasized the limitation to the minimum
contacts doctrine, but no fundamental change was made in the
Court's standard for determining the sufficiency of contacts, and it
remains the same as that developed in the International Shoe case-
" Sobeloff, supra note 9, at 197.
20326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2" It is consistent with due process for a state to extend its jurisdiction over those hav-
ing minimum contacts with the forum. Id. at 319.
" Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). See Recent Decisions, So
Mich. L. Rev. 1381 (1952). See also Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 1664, 1670 (1958). The minimum
contacts doctrine has been extended to individuals. See, e.g., State ex rel. Weber v. Register,
67 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953), where a non-resident's sale of an orange grove within the forum
state constituted a sufficient contact with the forum to permit in personam jurisdiction over
him.
'
3 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), Case Note, 12 Sw. L.J.
381 (1958); Note, 36 Texas L. Rev. 658 (1958). It has been suggested that possibly,
the McGee decision, permitting jurisdiction over "one act" transactions, may be limited to
defendants which, like insurance companies, are carrying on activities subject to a special
scheme of state regulation. See, e.g., Brown, The Supreme Court 1957 Term, 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 77, 196 (1958).
4 See, e.g., Recent Decisions, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 569 (1959). In Smyth v. Twin State Im-
provement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951), It was held that the negligent repair-
ing of a roof within the forum state was a sufficient contact to permit in personam juris-
diction over a non-resident corporation.
as 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See also, Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). It
should be pointed out that there are several distinctions between the Hanson case and the
McGee case other than the degree of contact with the forum state. See Recent Decisions,
supra note 24. As an indication that the flexible transgression from Pennoyer to Internation-
al Shoe was not without limits, the Court in the Hanson case pointed out that "it is a
mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the per-
sonal jurisdiction of state courts." 357 U.S. at 251.
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"ethe traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice."2
Consequently, the Court had indicated those factors to be considered
in deciding personal jurisdiction, but it had not explained how each
factor was to be weighed in combination with the others. 7
In holding that defendant's contacts with the forum state were
insufficient to subject him to the minimum contacts doctrine," the
court followed the established pattern of law, since at the time the
cause of action accrued, Texas had failed to legislate in order to take
advantage of the jurisdictional flexibility permitted by the minimum
contacts doctrine. 9 Other than Texas' non-resident motorist statute °
and its Texas Business Corporation Act,"1 the only applicable statutes 2
26 326 U.S. at 320. Still of importance was another pronouncement in the International
case that it is the quality and nature, rather than the quantity, of corporate activities that
is material. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
" Kurland, supra note 12, at 86.
28270 F.2d at 555.
" See Wilson, In Personam Jurisdiction over Non-Residents: An Invitation and a Pro-
posal, 9 Baylor L. Rev. 363 (1957). Clearly, courts are able to obtain in personam jurisdic-
tion over non-residents after the forum state has enacted "minimal contacts" legislation
when the same fact situation would not have permitted such jurisdiction prior to the en-
actment of the statute. See, e.g., Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d
518 (5th Cir. 1953); Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mut. Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 487, 120
N.Y.S.2d 418 (1953). See also Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 416 (1955).
'°Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2039(a) (1950).
" Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 8.01(A) (1955) provides that no corporation shall
have the right to transact business in this state unless it shall have procured a certificate
of authority to do so, and 8.01 (B) describes the activities that shall not be considered the
transacting of business in Texas "for the purposes of the Act." Article 8.01 (A) states
that service can be had upon the officers of foreign corporations that are "authorized" to
transact business. Article 8.01 (B) provides that "authorized" foreign corporations shall ap-
point a registered agent for service and if there is a failure to do so, service may be made
upon the Secretary of State and by registered mail to the non-resident corporation. The
weaknesses of this statute are apparent: It does not cover the actions that might be brought
against non-resident corporations or individuals who have not complied with the act and
the non-complying corporations are left subject to other articles, infra note 31; article
8.01 (B) does not consider "transacting business in interstate commerce" or "conducting an
isolated transaction completed within a period of thirty days and not in the course of a
number of repeated transactions of like nature" to be doing business under the act; article
8.01 (B) provides for substituted service upon "authorized corporations" without language
to clearly indicate whether or not such form of service could be used to obtain jurisdiction
of non-resident authorized corporations who were engaged only in activities that smacked
of interstate commerce or that consisted of sporadic transactions that could be com-
pleted in thirty days; and it obviously would be to the best interest of a foreign corpora-
tion to refuse to comply with the act in order to be immune from the substituted service
provisions of it.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031 (1950) provides for service of process in Texas
on the officer or agent of a non-resident corporation, joint stock company, or association.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031 (a) (1950) requires all foreign corporations doing busi-
ness in Texas to grant a power of attorney to the Secretary of State as its service agent, and
upon failure to do so, provision is made for the surrender of judicial privileges and for tacit
approval of substituted service methods. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1529 (1945) applies
only to pecuniary foreign corporations and requires the filing of articles of incorporation
in order to receive a permit to do business. It also provides a non-exclusive list of activities
that are not considered the doing of business.
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were not broad enough" to permit the exercise of authority over non-
resident corporations to the extent permitted by recent judicial
decisions. However, article 2031(b) became effective August 10,
1959,14 and this legislation, extending the jurisdiction of Texas courts,
plugged the numerous loopholes which had placed the local citizens
at a disadvantage in their dealings with non-residents. Consequently,
this statute has placed non-resident individuals and corporations on
an equal footing, and Texas now has the statutory authority to
exercise jurisdiction over either whenever the necessary minimum
contacts with the forum state have taken place." Since this same
type of statute has been applied retroactively in other states,"5 it is
probable that on remand the court's decision would be based on a
new interpretation of the facts in terms of Texas' new minimum
contacts statute. It is possible that the defendant's activities, consist-
ing of a suit filed by him in a Texas court," his working interest in
a Texas oil lease, and his contractual obligation to pay his share of
the maintenance and development expenses to the leased land, would
be held to constitute sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state; hence, in personam jurisdiction over the defendant could be
acquired by a Texas court. Moreover, to avoid the possible conten-
tion that article 2031 (b) is inapplicable because the procedural re-
quirements for notification under rule 108 and article 2031(b) are
different, there is no valid reason why the plaintiff cannot have the
defendant cited again under article 2031 (b).
In enacting article 2031(b), Texas has taken advantage of the
Supreme Court's present position by adopting legislation permitting
" These statutes do not, in terms, apply to individuals. Article 2031 applies only to
such entities as are adequately represented by normally responsible local agents and it is
not useful in reaching those corporations that maintain neither ascertainable places of busi-
ness nor agents that may be reached by usual processes. Further, article 2031 leaves open
the question of appropriateness of service. See Wilson, Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 22
Tex. B.J. 221 (1959).
a
4 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2031(b) (Supp. 1959). Section 5 of this article pro-
vides for notification of suit by substituted service upon the Secretary of State, who is to
forward a copy of the process to the defendant by registered mail.
" There has been considerable dispute as to whether non-resident jurisdiction can be
based solely upon a single tort committed or contract made by an individual without violat-
ing the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
With only rare exceptions, state and lower federal courts have held that jurisdiction so ob-
tained does not violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.,
89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950); Nelson v. Miller, 11 ll.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957);
Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951). Contra, Er-
langer Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
a"E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956). In Nelson v. Miller, supra
note 35, Sec. 17 was applied retroactively to causes of action which arose prior to its effec-
tive date. Cf. Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953).
" This refers to the non-resident defendant's suit in a Texas court to compel convey-
ance to him of the oil lease interest which he had acquired by means of the trustee's sale.
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the forum state to liberalize its in personam jurisdiction over non-
residents in order to further the protection of its own citizens. Con-
sidering the far-reaching consequences of the numerous exceptions
to the Pennoyer rule, it is apparent that the law in this field has
made' almost a complete reversal from the views expressed in Pennoyer
v. Neff."8 It is characteristic of our legal institutions that the first
break with the rigidity of the Pennoyer rule was made, not in terms
of a bold adjustment of legal concepts to counter this restriction on
state power, but in terms that purported to fit new exceptions into
an established framework of jurisdictional concepts. It is unfortunate
that a bold adjustment in the form of a doctrine of forum non con-
veniens was not developed. Nevertheless, the end result may be very
nearly identical in that the relevant determinants under forum non
conveniens are quite similar to the test which the courts are presently
developing, viz., a balancing of interests between the inconvenience
imposed on the non-resident on the one hand and the interest of the
state in affording judicial protection to its citizens on the other.
Accordingly, future Texas decisions under article 2031(b) will
probably place great reliance on the minimum contacts doctrine in
order to permit a fair balancing of interests between the parties.
Rice M. Tilley, Jr.
Constitutional Law - Congressional Investigations
First Amendment Limitations on Power To Punish
for Contempt of Congress
Petitioner, a former college teacher, was called as a witness before
a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities
investigating Communist infiltration into the field of education.
Following his refusal to answer questions as to his membership in
and affiliation with the Communist Party, petitioner was convicted
for contempt of Congress in the federal district court; the Supreme
Court, in the light of Watkins v. United States' remanded the case
to the circuit court (which had affirmed the judgment) for further
consideration. Thereafter the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reaffirmed the conviction. Held: Where first
amendment rights are asserted to bar congressional inquiries, resolu-
tion of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests involved in the particular
SSee Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 311.
1354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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circumstances. If the balance is struck in favor of the governmental
interests, the inquiry does not offend the first amendment to the
Constitution. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
(5-4).
Congress has the power, implied from the necessary and proper
clause of the Constitution, to make investigations related to matters
with which it may deal directly.! However, the scope of this power
may be broader than the field of permissible direct legislative action
since information concerning matters on which it cannot directly
deal may be of aid to Congress in exercising its valid authority.'
Either house may conduct inquiries itself, or may delegate its powers
(usually to committees and subcommittees).' Refusal of witnesses to
cooperate in an investigation is considered contempt of Congress,
punishable either by Congress through its own processes' or through
judicial trial based on a statute providing punishment for contumacy
before Congress.! The early contempt cases were concerned with the
scope of investigative power in terms of inherent limitations of the
source of that power," but recently the emphasis seems to have
shifted to considerations of the Bill of Rights as a restraint upon
the legislative power of investigation. However, thus far, only the
privilege against self-incrimination and the due process requirement
that the questions be pertinent to the subject matter under investiga-
tion have been consistently upheld as limitations upon the investiga-
tory power of Congress.'
The first amendment protections of free speech, press, and associa-
tion have also been invoked as a defense, both in contempt of Con-
gress proceedings"' and in state legislative contempt proceedings
as a fundamental right incorporated by the fourteenth amend-
ment."' These freedoms of expression are very closely allied
since press and speech are merely differing media for the com-
munication of ideas and effective advocacy of such ideas is enhanced
'U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
3 Gose, The Limits of Congressional Investigating Power, 10 Wash. L. Rev. 61 (193 5).
4 Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
'Anderson v. Dunn, 5 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 61 (1821).
6 52 Star. 942, 2 U.S.C.A. § 192 (1938).7 E.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168 (1881).
8E.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Barsky v. United States, 167
F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
'See Watkins v. United States, supra note 8; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155
(1955).
1 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953).




by group association." They are all protected by the Constitution as
fundamental, indispensable liberties"3 under the hypothesis that
speech will rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, and
free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies.'
However, as these rights are not absolute," the question is not
whether, but to what extent the first amendment permits suppression
of free expression." The first attempt to evolve a standard for deter-
mining when the first amendment protects a witness from punish-
ment for contempt of Congress was an adaptation of the "clear and
present danger" test.' This test requires that one be permitted to
advocate any idea he wishes unless there is a "clear and present dan-
ger" that a substantive evil which Congress has a right to prevent
will result therefrom." Accordingly, the evil must be extremely
serious and the danger highly imminent. In an attempt to adapt
this test to circumstances involving silence, the court in Barsky v.
United States" substituted the requirement that the danger "be re-
presented as being reasonably potential" rather than "clear and pre-
sent." But, it was not until United States v. Rumely" that the Su-
preme Court acknowledged, by implication, first amendment limita-
tions" upon congressional inquiries; and since Rumnely the only test
considered by the Court has been that of balancing the interests of
the government against those of the individual. This is the "reason-
ableness" test which has been used both in the field of economic
liberties and in other areas of personal liberties." This test has been
applied differently in the two areas. In the economic cases, once a
valid governmental policy has been established, the actual balancing
of interests by the courts has been largely nugatory; 4 whereas, in
the area of personal liberties, the courts have, in the main, been very
zealous in applying the balancing process." When the test is applied
to first amendment limitations on congressional inquiries, the in-
12N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
" Id. at 461.
14 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
" Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925).
1 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
'"See Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843
(1948).
88Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
"Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
20167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
2345 U.S. 41 (1953).
2Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
2"Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See Boudin, Congressional and Agency
Investigations: Their Uses and Abuses, 35 Va. L. Rev. 143, 197-201 (1949).
"4 Berman v. Parker, supra note 23.
"Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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vestigation will be deemed to have offended the first amendment
only if the interest of the witness in not cooperating outweighs that
of the government in conducting the inquiry."6 However, the
interest of the individual involves more than the privilege to speak
as he chooses, for the first amendment gives, also, the freedom not
to speak as the government chooses and freedom from compulsive
disclosure of moral, political, or religious opinions." Fear of exposure
to public scorn and retribution for expressing unorthodox views
and advocating unpopular causes may undoubtedly have the same
coercive effect upon the exercise of first amendment rights as im-
prisonment or fines."s
The Court distinguished the principal case from Watkins v. United
States9 where the petitioner, as a witness, refused to answer certain
questions which he objected to as not pertinent to the congressional
inquiry. In that case, the Court, although discussing at length the
vagueness of the congressional resolution authorizing the investi-
gations, held that the petitioner's refusal to answer was justified
on the ground that the questions posed were not pertinent. At first
impression, it seemed that Watkins was perhaps an indication of a
trend which would give more emphasis to first amendment limita-
tions upon the investigatory powers of Congress, but actually the
Court avoided this constitutional issue. Thus, the principal case is
the first real indication of the attitude of the Court toward first
amendment limitations on congressional inquiries. The majority based
its holding on the balancing principle, i.e., that Congress may abridge
the first amendment if the governmental interest in the abridgement
is greater than the individual's interest in exercising that freedom."0
In deciding that the balance should be struck in favor of the govern-
ment, the Court reasoned that the Communist Party cannot be con-
sidered as an ordinary political party because its tenets include the
ultimate overthrow of the government by force and violence."
Hence, investigations in the field of Communist activities are per-
missible on the principle of the government's right of self-pre-
servation." The dissent, however, seems to recognize the balancing
principle only in cases where conduct is sought to be regulated and
speech is only indirectly affected." The dissenters take the position
2354 U.S. 178 (1957).
""Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (dissent).
"'American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
2' Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
'0Id. at 198.
"Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
"Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
"Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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that the real interests involved were not balanced by the Court,
and that, if balancing were proper, the Court should have balanced
the right of the government to preserve itself, not against the in-
dividual's right to refrain from revealing Communist affiliations, but
against the interest of all citizens in being able to join organizations
and advocate causes without later being subject to governmental
penalties. It would seem doubtful, however, that a different concept
of interests to be balanced would tip the scale in favor of the indivi-
dual when Communist activities are involved. 4 Moreover, it has
been suggested that, whatever the test, Congress itself must make
certain procedural changes in the inquiries, viz., (1) prohibition of
photographs and broadcasts during the hearing and (2) the right
to secure and examine a limited number of favorable witnesses and
to cross-examine hostile witnesses, personally or by counsel. 5
Recognition that a witness has a right to refuse to answer even
pertinent questions in congressional investigations seems to be based
neither on a right of silence nor of privacy, but rather on the in-
dividual's interest in being able to join organizations, advocate causes,
and express unorthodox beliefs without fear of later being punished
by the government through exposure to public scorn and retri-
bution. Even though these rights should not be abridged easily, Con-
gress must be allowed to investigate as an aid to intelligent and in-
formed lawmaking. The problem of balancing these often conflict-
ing interests becomes even more complex when the government is
trying to protect itself against overthrow by essentially undemocratic
forces. However, the balancing principle, as applied by the majority
in the instant case, prescribes no standards for the exercise of discre-
tion by the courts. Actually the application seems to be that employed
in the area of economic liberties-once the valid purpose of "self
preservation" is established, the balancing process becomes super-
ficial. The application suggested by the dissent might be better
inasmuch as it encompasses the idea that each time the balancing
principle is employed, cognizance must be taken of two threats to
our democratic form of government, viz., the one alleged by the
government and also the more subtle threat that the democratic
structure of our government will be undermined by encroachments
on first amendment freedoms. It may well be that more is lost than
gained when undemocratic methods from within are used to combat
undemocratic forces from without. A more desirable accommodation
" Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).




of these interests might be reached if the balancing principle, as
suggested by the dissent, would be applied only upon proof by the
government that abridgement of first amendment freedoms is neces-
sary to protect the government from some substantial evil, neces-
sary in the sense of being essential because every other constitutional
method of obtaining information has failed and time is now of the
essence. However, it is not in the courts' power to resolve completely
the problem, for much of the trouble seems to lie in the abuse of
investigatory powers by certain committees. Only Congress can
rectify this, perhaps by setting up codes of conduct for committees
and promptly censuring any breach of such code or by providing
procedural requirements which would afford witnesses and persons
implicated by witnesses some of the safeguards inherent in a judicial
trial. However, it appears that until the scope of this limitation is
defined more clearly by the courts and until Congress regulates more
definitely its investigating committees, witnesses may expect protec-
tion from the first amendment only when the government's interest
is something less crucial than "self-preservation."
Earldean V. S. Robbins
Corporations - Corporate Combination - De Facto
Merger and Stockholder Appraisal Rights
A Corporation negotiated to acquire B Corporation. The resulting
agreement provided that B would assign all of its assets to A; A
would assume all of B's liabilities and would issue stock to B; where-
upon B would dissolve and distribute the stock to its sole shareholder.
The board of directors of each corporation approved the transaction,
and a favorable majority vote of the stockholders of A was obtained.
However, dissenting stockholders of A brought suit against B alleg-
ing that the transaction constituted a de facto merger. On this basis
the stockholders sought to be paid the fair market value of their
shares under a Delaware statute allowing appraisal rights in the case of
a merger. Held: Where stockholders of a purchasing corporation
suffer no injury because the essential nature of an enterprise has not
changed, there is no de facto merger; therefore, dissenting share-
holders will be denied appraisal rights. As to these shareholders the
transaction in legal effect constitutes a purchase of assets, even
though the same transaction might constitute a de facto merger as
to stockholders of the selling corporation. Heilbrunn v. Sun Chemi-
cal Corp., -Del.-, 150 A.2d 755 (1959).
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A corporate merger is deemed to occur when two or more corpo-
rations unite through a transfer of assets and liabilities into one
of the corporations which continues in existence, the other cor-
porations being absorbed therein.' However, mere purchase of
another corporation's assets does not necessarily constitute a mer-
ger, especially when the seller maintains its separate existence and
the consideration for the sale moves to the seller and not to its
stockholders.! The corporate merger serves to unite stockholders
as well as assets of the merging corporations, while the primary
function of a corporate sale of assets, historically, was to facilitate
the winding up of the selling corporation, the proceeds (usually
cash or stock of the purchasing corporation) therefrom being
transferred by the seller to its shareholders upon dissolution.!
However, neither a merger nor a sale of assets occurs when two or
more corporations or their shareholders merely exchange stock and
all corporations continue an independent existence.4
In the case of merger or alienation of assets, early common-law
principles required unanimous shareholder consent,' and unless a cor-
poration was failing, a sale of all its assets for cash or securities would
be enjoined or set aside on application of even one shareholder.!
Modern needs of the corporate form of doing business prompted
state legislatures to authorize corporate combination when approved
by less than all shareholders,' but early decisions held that shareholders
of a selling corporation who dissented from majority approval of a
particular combination were entitled to recover the fair market value
of their shares in the assets of the consolidated corporation! s This
protection was based on the theory that each shareholder has a con-
tractual right to have the corporation fulfill the purposes for which
it was created, and any merger was deemed to force the stock of
another corporation upon the dissenters, thereby destroying the origi-
'See Fidanque v. American Maracaibo Co., 33 Del. Ch. 262, 92 A.2d 311 (1952); 15
Fletcher, Corporations § 7153 (rev. ed. 1938).
'Chicago, S.F. & C. Ry. v. Ashling, 160 Ill. 373, 43 N.E. 373 (1895); 15 Fletcher,
op. cit. supra note 1, at § 7044.
a Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distribution of Shares, 19
Calif. L. Rev. 349 (1931).4 Butler v. New Keystone Copper, 10 Del. Ch. 371, 93 Atl. 380 (1915). In effect, one
corporation usually ends up a subsidiary of the other.
' See Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Cornell
L.Q. 420 (1939).
6 See, e.g., Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (New York 1861); see
also Comment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1132, 1133 (1959).7 Note, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 525 (1950); see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, S 251 (c) (1953);
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.03(b) (1955).
'See, e.g., Barnett v. Philadelphia Mkt. Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 Ati. 912 (1907).
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nal investment without due process of law.9 Subsequently, state
legislatures adopted the remedies provided by courts of equity by
enacting appraisal statutes which permitted dissenting shareholders
to be paid the fair market value of their shares in the case of a cor-
porate merger."0 Accordingly, the distinction between a merger and a
sale of assets took on great significance since some states allowed ap-
praisal rights in the case of a corporate merger but not in the case of
alienation of assets." However, seeming compliance with one author-
ized method of corporate combination, (e.g., sale of assets) was not
recognized by the courts when the method used assumed standardized
characteristics of another authorized device, (e.g., statutory mer-
ger) ." A combination of this nature was held to constitute a de facto
merger, and dissenting shareholders were allowed to recover as if a
statutory merger had occurred. 3
The fact that the shareholders of the purchasing corporation were
seeking recovery under a theory of de facto merger places the instant
case in a somewhat unique category since dissenting shareholders of
the selling corporation generally choose to seek appraisal rights. 4
Some courts, in deciding whether or not a de facto merger exists as
to the dissenting shareholders of a selling corporation, have required
certain mechanical elements of a merger to be present, e.g., assump-
tion of the liabilities of the selling corporation by the purchasing cor-
poration;15 dissolution of the seller upon completion of the transac-
tion; l and distribution of the purchasing corporation's stock to
shareholders of the selling corporation. 7 However, in view of the
close similarity in form between a present-day merger and sale of
assets,"8 the very recent cases appear to develop a new theory of de
facto merger. Under this theory, the economic consequences of a
transaction are considered for purposes of evaluating the gravity of
the change in a shareholder's investment rather than certain stand-
'Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858); International & G.N. R.R. v.
Bremond, 53 Tex. 96 (1880).
'° See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 (1953); Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.11
(1957). This right of appraisal, however, is conditioned upon shareholder compliance with
certain statutory provisions. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.12 (1955).
"See Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 420 (1959).
"See, e.g., Finch v. Warrior Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 Atl. 54 (1928).
"' Drug Inc. v. Hunt, 35 Del. 399, 168 Atl. 87 (1933); City of Altoona v. Richardson
Gas & Oil Co., 81 Kan. 717, 106 Pac. 1025 (1910).
14 150 A.2d at 757.
"Troupiansky v. Disston & Sons, 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
"Marks v. Autocar Co., 153 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
"Helvering v. Winston Bros., 76 F.2d 381 (sth Cir. 1935).
" See Comment, supra note 6, at 1138.
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ardized characteristics of the combination viewed in the abstract."
Thus, when the purchasing corporation in reality is the seller be-
cause of the greater size and value of the corporation appearing to
sell, a dissenting stockholder of the purported purchasing corpora-
tion may recover the fair market value of his shares on the theory of
de facto merger since in effect the nature of his investment has been
completely changed." On this basis, the instant case would appear to
be decided logically since the economic realities of this transaction
show no substantial alteration of investment of shareholders of the
purchasing corporation.21 Accordingly, the court failed to find a de
facto merger even though standardized characteristics of a merger
were present,2 and the question of whether dissenting stockholders
are interested in the purchasing corporation or the selling corporation
would appear to be immaterial. Under the recent Texas Business Cor-
poration Act, dissenting shareholders of both the purchasing and
selling corporations are entitled to appraisal rights in the case of a
merger whereas in a sale of assets, only dissenting shareholders of the
selling corporation are entitled to the fair value of their shares." It
appears that this appraisal right is accorded the dissenting shareholder
despite failure to show injury.'
When a majority of stockholders choose to approve corporate
merger for the purpose of economic expansion or otherwise, and a
dissenting stockholder is faced with the risk inherent in a modified
venture plus the added contingency of receiving stock different from
that which induced the original investment, legislative policy favoring
appraisal rights would seem justified. Moreover, in view of the
similarity between the form of a merger and a sale of assets, the
better view would not permit a majority of stockholders to approve
a sale of assets which secures the same result as a merger, thereby de-
priving a dissenting stockholder of appraisal rights under most state
statutes. Following the suggestion of the instant case, where a dis-
senting shareholder is able to show a serious reduction in dividend
rate, pro rata earnings, redemption price, or the dissolution prefer-
ence of his shares, or that his investment has been gravely altered in
any other respect, a statute might well allow appraisal rights regard-
" See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958); see also, Bloch
v. Baldwin Lomomotive Works, 75 Pa. D. & C. 24 (Common Pleas 1950) (overruled by
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-311F, 908C (1957)).
20 Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., supra note 19.
21 150 A.2d at 758.
12 150 A.2d at 757.
23Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.11 (1957).
2 Leeds, Merger, Consolidation, Reorganization and Receivership Under the Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act, 3-A Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 490 (Appendix 1956).
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less whether the transaction is deemed a merger or sale of assets.
The Texas approach would seem to reach a desirable result when
the transaction is deemed to be a merger in that an eighty per-
cent majority vote of approval is required (thereby insuring that
a great majority is in favor of accepting the risk of any future con-
tingency which may follow from the combination) but any dissent-
ing shareholder of the remaining twenty percent is entitled to ap-
praisal rights regardless of the effect of the transaction upon his in-
vestment. However, the Texas statute poses the same problem en-
countered in the instant case in that a transaction which purports
to be a sale of assets may deny appraisal rights to shareholders of the
purchasing corporation even though the nature of their investment
has been gravely altered. Thus, an amendment to the Texas statute
may be in order abolishing the distinction between merger and pur-
chase of assets for purposes of awarding appraisal rights.
Ed G. Ruland
Fire Insurance - Concurrent Insurance Clause -
Effect of Breach
P procured a fire insurance policy from D and later obtained an-
other fire policy upon the same property from another insurer. The
second policy, obtained without D's permission, was purchased by P
after receiving information that the policy with D was worthless.
Both policies, drawn according to the Texas Standard Form Fire
Policy, contained clauses requiring permission for additional insur-
ance' and disclaiming liability if the hazard is increased or if any
provision of the contract is being violated at the time of loss.' P
sought recovery from D for a fire loss and D contended that the
procurement of the second policy without D's permission prevented
recovery on the first policy. Held: Where one Texas Standard Form
Fire Policy is in effect when a second one is issued by a different in-
surer and both policies contain a prohibiton against additional in-
surance, the first policy remains effective and renders the second
"'If the co-insurance clause is not applied, no other fire insurance is permitted unless
the total amount is inserted in the blanks which follow: Item No. 1- ; 2
3- ; 4 -; 5 -. "
"'Unless otherwise provided in writing added hereto, this company shall not be liable
for loss accruing . .. (a) while the hazard is increased by any means within the knowledge
or control of the insured, provided that such increase in hazard is not usual and incidental
to the occupancy as herein described . . . (e) while any other stipulation or condition of
this policy is being violated."
[Vol. 14
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policy unenforceable if the second policy is obtained under a mistake
of fact that does not increase the moral risk of over-insurance.3
American Ins. Co. v. Kelley, - Tex. -, 325 S.W.2d 370 (1959).
The majority of concurrent insurance clauses4 either limit addi-
tional insurance without a specific statement concerning the validity
of such insurance,' or specifically prohibit other insurance whether
it is valid or not.! Where the former clause exists, additional unen-
forceable insurance, by the better view,' does not invalidate the
policy in question, even though the additional insurance is unen-
forceable because a like clause in it has been violated! However, the
latter clause has been construed to terminate liability, regardless of
the enforceability of the additional insurance or the reason for its
invalidity' unless the additional insurance is void on its face." The
purpose of these clauses is to prevent the increased moral hazard that
may result from over-insurance," although if the insured is un-
aware of the additional policy" or does not regard it as being in
force,13 the policy in question may be sustained.
Older Texas Standard Form Fire Policies have included a provi-
sion terminating liability upon the procurement of another insurance
policy "whether valid or not,"'4 and Texas courts adhered to the
prevailing view toward this type of clause, viz., if violated, recovery
on both policies was precluded." Moreover, this clause has been
'Griffin, Norvell, and Hamilton, JJ., dissenting; Calvert, Walker, JJ., concurring on
the basis of the opinion of the court of civil appeals, 316 S.W.2d 452.
4 The Texas concurrent insurance clause is found in note 1 supra. The 1918 New York
Standard Form Fire Policy contained the "whether valid or not" provision. The 1943 Re-
vised New York Policy eliminated this provision and allowed the insurer to attach its own
provisions concerning other insurance. By the mid-1950's, only Texas, New Hampshire,
Minnesota, and Massachusetts had not adopted the revised form. See Vance, Insurance §§
7, 144 (3rd ed. 1951).
'Sweeting v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 83 Md. 63, 34 Atl. 826 (1896).
6Heldreth v. Federal Land Bank, 111 W. Va. 602, 163 S.E. 50 (1932).
' Vance, op. cit. supra note 4, at S 144.
'Cornett v. Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 208 Iowa 450, 224 N.W. 524 (1929); Hub-
bard & Spencer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 33 Iowa 325 (1871); Sweeting v. Mutual Fire Ins.
Co., 83 Md. 63, 34 AtI. 826 (1896). Contra, Graham v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 182
F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1950).
'Home Ins. Co. v. Shriner, 235 Ala. 165, 177 So. 890 (1937); Heldreth v. Federal
Land Bank, 111 W. Va. 602, 163 S.E. 50 (1932).
'°Home Ins. Co. v. Shriner, supra note 9; Cox v. Home Ins. Co., 331 Mo. 10, 52
S.W.2d 872 (1932).
"American Ins. Co. v. Replogel, 114 Ind. 1, 15 N.E. 810 (1888); Continental Ins.
Co. v. Riggs, 277 Ky. 361, 126 S.W.2d 853 (1939).
"Home Ins. Co. v. Shriner, 235 Ala. 165, 177 So. 890 (1937); Continental Ins. Co.
v. Riggs, supra note 11.
"Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Garner, 56 I1. App. 199 (1894).
'4325 S.W.2d at 371.
"British Am. Assur. Co. v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 37 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1931); Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Levy & Rosen, 222 S.W. 216 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1920).
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construed to include a completely void policy,"6 and the intent,"
knowledge," or mistake" of the insured was no defense. 0
The instant case is the first judicial construction of the present
Texas Standard Form Fire Policy, which has eliminated the "whether
valid or not" clause, 1 and it reverses the Texas position toward viola-
tion of the concurrent insurance clause. In altering the rule of
British Am. Assur. Co. v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co.,22 the elimina-
tion of the "whether valid or not" provision, and the consequent
consideration of the motives of the insured were determinative."
Thus, the court reasoned that the "other insurance" contemplated by
the initial insurer must be enforceable, and since the concurrent
insurance clause in the second policy was violated in its inception, it
never became enforceable and was not violative of the same prohibi-
tive clause in the initial policy. However, since the purpose of the
prohibition is prevention of the moral hazard that arises from over-
insurance," recovery is limited to an insured whose mental attitude
toward the additional policy has not increased the risk of the in-
surer. " Although the reasoning of the court concerning the unen-
forceability of the second policy is in accord with the authority upon
which it relies,"6 some courts construing similar contractual provisions
have not placed express limitations of intent upon the right to recover
if the second policy is held unenforceable. 7 Accordingly, other
courts have held that an insured's motive" or awareness of the addi-
tional policy" does not bar recovery. The court in the instant case,
however, reasoned that a requirement of good faith was necessary to
protect the interests of the insurer." Here, the facts indicate that
the insured was not overly doubtful of his original insurer's stability,
since he reported the loss, representing at that time that no other
"6Southern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Barr, 148 S.W. 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); Wilson v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 33 S.W. 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
17National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dorroh, 133 S.W. 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
2 Gross v. Colonial Assur. Co., 121 S.W. 517 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
"' Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Two States Tel. Co., 289 S.W. 726 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926).
" But see Home Ins. Co. v. Collins, 55 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.
21 325 S.W.2d at 370-1.
2237 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931).
23 325 S.W.2d at 372-3.
24 American Ins. Co. v. Replogel, 114 Ind. 1, 15 N.E. 810, 812 (1888).
22 325 S.W.2d at 373.
2 
Id. at 372.27 See, e.g., Kossmehl v. Millers Nat'l Ins. Co., 238 Mo. App. 671, 185 S.W.2d 293
(1945); DeShields v. Ins. Co., 125 S.C. 457, 118 S.E. 817 (1923). But see American Ins.
Co. v. Replogel, 114 Ind. 1, 15 N.E. 810 (1888).
2Cornett v. Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 208 Iowa 450, 224 N.W. 524 (1929).
2"Hubbard & Spencer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 33 Iowa 325 (1871).
3325 S.W.2d at 373.
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policies covered the property, but the court abandons its subjective
inquiry into the motives of the insured at this point and finds that
the representation the insured thought to be false was in fact true,
because it had initially held that the second policy was unenforce-
able in its inception.31 Thus, the instant case represents a new
approach by Texas courts to the problem of violation of the con-
current insurance clause present in the Texas Standard Form Fire
Policy.
The potpourri of results obtained on this problem is indicative of
the difficulty courts confront in attempting to reconcile an obvious
violation of policy terms with a strict attitude toward insurers and
sympathy for policy holders. The court apparently recognized that
if the second policy was not "other insurance" (and thus not a
violation of the terms of the first policy), injustice could result to
the first insurer since the moral risk may be increased by the addi-
tional unenforceable policy. Thus, it attempted to limit application
of this construction by requiring a good faith purchase by the
insured. Although this limitation seems to be a better reasoned
rule than the rule of courts holding the first policy valid irrespective
of intent, if the court is truly concerned with the moral hazard it
would have been closer to reality in following the reasoning of
earlier Texas cases barring recovery on both policies3 since it is
probable that even an innocent attempt to over-insure will increase
the moral risk of the insurer.
Richard N. Countiss
Oil and Gas - Leases - Implied Covenants
An oil and gas lease, containing no express agreements for man-
datory drilling, was executed in 1940 for a primary term of ten
years. In 1956, the lessor sued to have the lease terminated because
of cessation of production after the primary term and, in the alter-
native, for partial cancellation because of the lessee's alleged breach
of the implied convenant to develop and of an implied covenant to
explore. The lessee had completed a dual production oil and gas
well in 1949 and acidized the well in 1950. The well was a marginal
producer and no further drilling or reworking operations occurred
until September 1956, subsequent to lessor's filing of the instant
31 Id. at 374.
" See, e.g., Boatner v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co., 241 S.W. 136 (Tex. Comm. App.
1922); Boatner v. Home Ins. Co., 239 S.W. 928 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).
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suit, at which time the well was reworked successfully and produc-
tion was thereby increased considerably. Held, for the lessee on all
three counts: A covenant to explore (as distinguished from the
covenant of additional development) is not implied in an oil and gas
lease after production in paying quantities is obtained. Clifton v.
Koontz, - Tex. -, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).'
As the purpose of an oil, gas, and mineral lease is to obtain pro-
duction with payment of royalty,' the courts have found implied
covenants therein more readily than in other types of contracts.'
Where there are no express provisions relating to further drilling,4
the covenant for additional development with reasonable diligence'
is frequently implied after production in paying quantities has been
obtained. It requires the lessee to continue development of the lease
by drilling those wells which a prudent operator would drill under
the circumstances.- However, courts do not require an operator to
drill unless the lessor demonstrates that there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of profit after factors such as the interests of all parties, special
circumstances affecting the particular property, and general condi-
tions prevailing in the industry, have been considered.! The amount
of profit which must reasonably be expected is that which will cover
the costs of development and production and leave a reasonable profit
for the lessee! Moreover, testing of deeper horizons may be included
in the development covenant' as well as further drilling into an al-
ready producing strata. 0
Considerations of a separate covenant to explore have arisen be-
cause a few cases in some jurisdictions have removed the burden of
proof as to potential profit from the lessor when an unreasonable
1 The primary holding of the case concerns the definition of "production in paying
quantities" after the primary term.
2Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 129 Tex. 487, 492, 103 S.W.2d 965, 968 (1937).
aBrown, The Implied Covenant For Additional Development, 13 Sw. L.J. 149, 150
(1959).
4 W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929); Union
Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 42 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error ref.
Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 193 Pa. 451, 44 Atl. 555, 556 (1899).
6 Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928). The
mythical prudent operator is said to be one who acts with due regard to the interests of both
lessor and lessee. Brown, supra note 3, at 160.
'Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); Summers, Oil and Gas 5
135 (1927). See Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 11 Texas L. Rev. 399, 422-26 (1933).
8Fort Worth Nat'l Bank v. McLean, 245 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
n.r.e.
9Texas & Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 269 S.W. 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) error
dism.
"
9 Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928).
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period of time lapses. 1 Accordingly, there is authority that an
unreasonable delay in itself constitutes a prima facie case of breach;1"
when the delay is so unreasonable that the lessee appears to be hold-
ing the lease for speculative purposes only, a breach is conclusively
established and the element of potential profit becomes immaterial."3
The decisions which remove potential profit as a requirement are
said to be following a "modified" prudent operator standard."
Advocates for the proposition that there is a separate implied coven-
ant to explore reason that the injury to the lessor in being deprived
for an unreasonable period of an opportunity to acquire exploration
by another lessee is distinguishable from loss of potential royalties or
damage by drainage, i.e., where the lessee fails to perform additional
development." Thus, some cases have mentioned a duty to explore
both when the issue concerns testing of deeper strata than that from
which production has been obtained" and when the lessor wishes to
obtain additional development from producing strata." This argu-
ment is based on the theory that a prudent operator will often explore
with no guarantee of a reasonable chance for profit whereas he will
be more cautious in developing." Because of these distinctions, it has
been maintained that a separate covenant to explore has actually been
enforced and now only needs to be recognized." Others contend, how-
ever, that the exploration duty mentioned in cases is not distinguish-
able from that of development but rather contained therein; there-
fore, development is the only implied covenant that is needed.2"
The only Texas decision which expressly recognizes an implied
covenant of further exploration regardless of expected profit is that
of the court of civil appeals in Willingham v. Bryson." The supreme
11 Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934); Doss Oil Royalty
Co. v. The Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
12 Nolan v. Thomas, 228 Ark. 572, 309 S.W.2d 727 (1958); Doss Oil Royalty Co. v.
The Texas Co., supra note 11.
1 Sand Springs Home v. Clemens, - Okla. -, 276 P.2d 262 (1954).4 Jones, Rights and Remedies For Non-Development and Failure to Offset (Legal As-
pects), Southwestern Legal Foundation Fourth Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax., 57,
67-70 (1953).
"5 Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 Texas L. Rev. 553, 555
(1956).
"Trust Co. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 192 F.2d 282, 284 (10th Cir. 1951).
17 Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934); Sinclair Oil & Gas
Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959).SMeyers, supra note 15, at 557.
19 Meyers, The Covenant of Further Exploration: A Comment, 37 Texas L. Rev. 179,
180 (1958).
20 Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to Comment, 37
Texas L. Rev. 303, 322-31 (1959).
" 294 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). The court held that the lease was cancelled
unless the lessee commenced drilling to a deeper sand, the existence and potential production
of which were unknown.
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court in the principal case expressly overruled the Willingham case,"2
and thus definitely negatived the existence of a separate implied
covenant to explore in Texas. Accordingly, the covenant to develop
is apparently regarded as sufficient protection for the lessor and ex-
ploration is merely one aspect of development." Moreover, the
decision in the principal case is salutary for, if the court had recog-
nized the suggested covenant and its requirement to drill regardless
of expected profit, the prudent operator standard established by stare
decisis would have been eradicated and not merely "modified.""'
Burdening the lessee with an absolute duty to drill when he has no
reason to expect a profit would be far more than requiring him to
exercise reasonable diligence."5 Decisions which inflict this burden
on the lessee usually stress a public policy against a lessee's inactivity
over an unreasonable time, but it has been suggested that the intent
of the parties should determine implied covenants." In holding that
the lessor must show that the lessee had not acted prudently, the
court recognized reasonable expectation of profit as essential under
the facts of the instant case and held that the lessor had not shown
cause for such expectation. However, the court expressly declined
to pass on questions where an unreasonable length of time has elapsed
or where a very large tract is held by production from a small area."7
Hence, it is questionable whether the court would deem such conduct
by a lessee a breach of the prudent operator standard, although the
lessor has not shown that profit can reasonably be expected from
further drilling.
Since the court in the instant case has rejected the position that a
separate implied covenant of exploration will be recognized in Texas,
it would seem that lessors may obtain further development after
initial production only by enforcing the implied covenant to develop.
However, the court did cast doubt on the prudent operator test of
the development covenant. Does the court intend that a profit motive
be an essential element of the hypothetical prudent operator in all
factual situations, or just under facts like these where no unreason-
able delay or vast acreage is involved? This question being unan-
swered, it is doubtful whether a showing of potential profit will be
necessary in all cases in order to have a prima facie case of breach in
Texas. Equitable principles will probably control whenever a lessee
22 325 S.W.2d at 696.
"SSee Discussion Note, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1099 (1956).
4See Brown, supra note 20, at 326.
25 See Jones, supra note 14, at 69.
26 Discussion Note, supra note 23.
27325 S.W.2d at 696.
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flagrantly disregards implied obligations. Cases cited by the court
imply that the fictitious prudent operator, who acts with the inter-
ests of both lessee and lessor in mind, is the test in determining a
breach irrespective of the facts. The principal opinion is not so
broad. Accordingly, one may conclude that the burden of proof of
potential profit was on the lessor because the time lapse was not
unreasonable and the tract was not very large. It follows that the
principal case is precedent for future development cases only when
the factual situations are very similar.
Charles R. Johnson
Taxation - Accrued Incorme - Taxability of
Vehicle Dealers' Reserves
The taxpayers are automobile and trailer dealers who utilize the
accrual method of accounting. Their customers generally purchase
the vehicles on a credit basis, whereby they make a down payment
and execute an assignable or negotiable instrument payable to the
dealer which represents the balance of the purchase price plus in-
surance and a "finance charge." The dealers discount these instru-
ments "with recourse" to finance companies under contracts which
provide for immediate payment to the dealers of a major portion
of the purchase price and retention by the finance companies of the
remainder. The finance companies credit the amount retained to a
"dealer's reserve" account in the name of the dealer for the purpose
of securing performance by the dealer of his obligations, viz,
guarantee of payment of the instrument and other liabilities to the
finance company. The companies remit the amount in the reserve
to the dealers as their obligations are discharged. During the taxable
years involved, the dealers included in their gross income the cash
which they received in the year of sale but did not include amounts
which the finance companies had credited to the reserve accounts in
their names. The Commissioner proposed a deficiency assessment of
these amounts. Held: Accrual basis vehicle dealers realize taxable in-
come of amounts credited to "dealer's reserve" accounts in the year
in which they are credited. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446
(1959).
Prior to 1916 income tax legislation recognized only a cash basis
method of accounting,' and income was considered taxable only when
' 2 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 12.05 (1955).
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it was actually received.! The Revenue Act of 1916 authorized the
accrual method of accounting as a deviation from the cash basis,.
and thus certain taxpayers realized taxable income when it accrued
by generally accepted accounting principles rather than when it was
actually received.4 Accordingly, under the current rule a taxpayer
who keeps his books on the accrual basis of accounting is allowed to
use that method for tax purposes provided that income is clearly
reflected.' As the accrual method of accounting signifies the right
to receive income and not its actual receipt,' income is considered
taxable to an accrual basis taxpayer when all the facts have occurred
which fix its right of receipt and the amount thereof is reasonably
ascertainable.! However, if a contingency exists which creates rea-
sonable doubt as to the collectibility of the income8 or prevents
determination of the amount with reasonable certainty,9 the income
will not be considered accrued for tax purposes." The contingency
must be real and substantial, and mere vague possibilities affecting
determination of the amount or collection of the income will not
defer its accrual.'
The Commissioner's original position regarding credits to "deal-
er's reserve" accounts was that these amounts were taxable to ac-
crual basis dealers in the period in which they were credited on the
grounds that (1) the contingency of default on the part of the
purchaser was not sufficient to postpone accrual, and (2) the dealer
had the absolute right either to receive the amount in cash or to have
it applied in reduction of his liabilities to the finance company.2 The
Tax Court pointed out that the second ground would not apply in
situations where the dealers indorsed the instruments "without re-
course,""3 but sustained the Commissioner's first ground and affirmed
'Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920); Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co. v. Herold, 198 Fed. 199 (D.C. N.J. 1912), aft'd, 201 Fed. 918 (3rd Cir. 1913), cert.
denied, 231 U.S. 755 (1913).
a 13(d), 39 Stat. 771 (1916).
4 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 446. If the taxpayer utilizes the cash basis of accounting,
he realizes taxable income only when it is received, either actually or constructively. Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (i) (1957).
'Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (ii) (1959).8 Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
"Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
5
°Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
"Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290 (1932); Universal Oil
Products Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950).
12G.C.M. 9571, X-2 Cum. Bull. 153 (1931).
"a Shoemaker-Nash, Inc. 41 B.T.A. 417 (1940). In these situations, the only remedy of
the finance company upon default by the purchaser would be repossession of the vehicle
and forcing the dealer to repurchase it.
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the holding that the amounts in the reserves were taxable when cre-
dited whether the notes were "with" or "without" recourse. 4 The
circuit courts, on the other hand, viewed reserves which could be
diminished by charges for delinquent notes (i.e., reserves created
from the discount of "with recourse" notes) as subject to sufficient
contingencies that amounts therein could not accrue as income to
the dealers." These courts held that taxpayers realized taxable income
of amounts in "dealer's reserve" accounts only where the dealers
indorsed the instruments "without recourse."'" The Tax Court re-
jected this distinction as logically insupportable. 7 Subsequently the
Commissioner revised his position by pointing out as a third ground
for holding the amounts in the reserve taxable in the year of credit
that each sale by the dealers involved two distinct transactions. The
first transaction was the sale of the vehicle whereupon the dealer
realized taxable accrued income; the second transaction was the dis-
count of the instrument, which transaction was merely tantamount
to an assignment of accounts receivable." The Tax Court sustained
this "two-transaction" theory and also maintained its view that
there was an insufficient contingency to postpone accrual of income."
However, the majority of district and circuit courts continued to
hold that the contingency was sufficient to defer accrual of the
income." Moreover, these courts took the position that each sale
in essence involved one "three-cornered" transaction, rather than
two distinct transactions." Two circuit courts affirmed the deter-
minations of the Commissioner and the Tax Court. The Sixth Cir-
cuit sustained the Commissioner's two transaction theory," and the
"4Shoemaker-Nash, Inc., supra note 13; Ray Woods Used Cars, Inc., 11 CCH Tax.
Ct. Mem. 983 (1952).
" Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. United States, 141 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1944).
"Id. at 167. The court pointed out that reserves under this type of indorsement are
merely provisions for time of payment.
"Blaine Johnson, 25 T.C. 123, 130 (1955).
"8Rev. Rul. 57-2, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 17.
"Evans Motor Co., 29 T.C. 555 (1957).
"Texas Trailercoach v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1958); Modern Olds
v. United States, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1958). The Senate Finance Com-
mittee has reported its approval of a bill which will provide some relief to dealers who
followed the holdings of these courts. Under this bill, the dealers are given two alternatives
for paying the tax due on the income not previously reported. First, the dealers can treat
the amounts as required changes in accounting methods. Under this alternative reserves
built up prior to 1954 need not be reported, and only the excess of the current balance
over the 1954 balance is to be reported. The second alternative permits computation of the
deficiencies (or overassessments) which would arise if the income had been reported in the
prior years, and the sum of these amounts (plus interest up to the time of selecting this
alternative) may be paid in five annual installments, generally beginning in 1961. Staff of
Senate Comm. on Finance, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Income Tax Treatment of Cer-
tain Dealers' Reserves (Comm. Print 1960).
"1 Texas Trailercoach v. Commissioner, supra note 20.
'2Schaeffer v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1958).
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Seventh Circuit adopted the Commissioner's original position."
Without discussing whether the instant sales involved two distinct
transactions, the Court in the principal case pointed out that the
obligations to the finance companies were those of the dealers rather
than the purchasers."4 The Court then adopted the rationale of the
Commissioner's original position (and that of the Seventh Circuit),
holding that the dealers had a fixed right to receive the amounts in
the reserves either in cash or by discharge of their liabilities to the
finance companies; hence, these amounts were taxable in the year
of credit." As applied to the facts in the instant case this rationale
is supportable both in logic and authority. Since a taxpayer receives
income when an obligation is discharged by another for his benefit,"
it would follow that a fixed right to have an obligation discharged
constitutes accrued income to accrual basis taxpayers. However, the
opinion left completely open the question of whether "finance
charges" or other amounts which were credited to the reserve, but
were not part of the purchase price, would accrue to the dealer. The
Court pointed out that the dealers had failed to sustain their burden
of proof in this respect, since they had neither defined "finance
charges" nor shown how they were treated on the books of the
finance companies." It would seem that had the Court adopted the
"two-transaction" theory, these charges would constitute accrued
income as part of the contract price." However, the dealers then
would have been entitled to a deduction of a reasonable amount
for bad debts expense.
From the holding in the principal case it would seem that accrual
basis dealers realize taxable income of amounts credited to dealer's
reserve accounts in their names when: (1) the dealers have liabili-
ties to the finance companies arising out of their guaranty that the
vehicle purchaser will perform and other contractual obligations;3
0
"
3 Baird v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
24 360 U.S. at 463.
2' 360 U.S. at 465-66.
2" See Douglas v. Wilcutts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
279 U.S. 716 (1929).
27360 U.S. at 468.
"'Wiley v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1959).
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(c); cf. Schaeffer v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 861 (6th
Cir. 1958).
so In addition to the guaranty of payment by the vehicle purchaser, the dealers in the
instant case had the following contractual obligations to the finance companies: (1) an
obligation to purchase repossessed cars at an amount equal to the balance of the unpaid
note; (2) an obligation to share a portion of a refund of the service charge in case the
vehicle purchaser paid the note in full prior to maturity; and (3) an obligation to make
good any deficiency incurred in the resale of repossessed cars. The finance companies would
charge the amounts in the reserves in discharge of any of these obligations.
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(2) the finance companies are to credit the amounts in the reserve
directly out of the balance of the purchase price; and (3) the finance
companies are to charge the amounts in the reserves in discharge of
the obligations of the dealers. Obviously, many ostensibly similar
contracts will not fall within this limited category, and in future
litigation courts will be faced with questions left open in the prin-
cipal case. For example, the Court failed to reach a final determina-
tion on the question of whether the reserves were subject to sufficient
additional contingencies to defer accrual of the income. This question
would be of vital importance if the contracts were changed in such
a manner that the vehicle purchasers rather than the dealers were
obligated to the finance companies." Moreover, the question of
taxability of the finance charges and other amounts not part of
the balance of the purchase price remains unanswered.
Larry M. Lesh
Unincorporated Associations - Labor Unions
Member's Cause of Action for Conduct of
Another Member
P, while a member of defendant union's local in Galveston, ob-
tained employment in Dallas. The Galveston local granted P clear-
ance to be admitted to the union's local in Dallas, but the union's
business agent in Dallas refused P permission to assume the employ-
ment for which he had been accepted. The union offered P no remedy
on his complaint and warned P that continued complaining would
result in his dismissal from the union. P sued the union for damages
resulting from the alleged wrongful conduct of the union's agent.
The union filed a plea in abatement contending that an unincor-
porated association is not liable to one member for the conduct of
another member. Held: A member of an unincorporated association
has a cause of action against the association for intentional harm
caused by another member if the association authorizes or ratifies
the conduct of the wrongful member. United Ass'n of Journeymen v.
Borden, --- Tex.--, 328 S.W.2d 739 (1959).
At common law a labor union, as well as any other unincorporated
association, is not a legal entity distinct from its individual mem-
" The Senate Finance Committee proposed an amendment to the new bill which would
include this type of transaction. However, the court in the principal case expressly stated
that it was considering only situations in which the obligations were those of the dealers,
not the purchasers. 360 U.S. at 463.
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bers, and therefore cannot sue or be sued in its common or associate
name.' However, courts have utilized various theories regarding labor
unions which have modified and curtailed the operation of this com-
mon-law rule.' Federal courts have held that labor unions achieve an
entity status through necessary implication from federal statutes
recognizing their legal existence.' Many states have adopted this
view,' but other states have rejected it, reasoning that federal statutes
cannot create a quasi-corporate entity for purposes of suit.5 In the
absence of the federal rule, jurisdictions with no statute relating to
suability of unincorporated associations have developed other methods
to circumvent the common-law rule.' Statutes enacted by a majori-
ty of states, allowing suits against unincorporated associations, fall
within one of three categories: (1) statutes permitting some of the
members to sue and be sued for the benefit of the whole; (2) statutes
which allow an officer to represent the membership in judicial pro-
ceedings; and (3) statutes which allow the associate name to be used
as a party plaintiff or defendant.! The Texas statute falls within the
third category, and provides that unincorporated associations "doing
business within this state" may be sued in their common names.' Pur-
suant to this provision Texas courts have held that the statute consti-
'Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113 (1933); Vance v. McGinley, 39
Mont. 46, 101 Pac. 247 (1909).
Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 51
Yale L.J. 40 (1941).
3 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). This rule applies
only where federal rights are involved. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b); Sperry Products, Inc. v.
Association of Am. R.Rs., 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 744 (1943).
'Williams v. United Mine Workers, 294 Ky. 520, 172 S.W.2d 202 (1943); Varnado
v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933); McClees v. Grand Int'l Bhd., 59 Ohio
App. 477, 18 N.E.2d 812 (1938).
'Forest City Mfg. Co. v. International Ladies' Garment Union, Local 104, 233 Mo.
App. 935, 111 S.W.2d 934 (1938).
6 E.g., waiver of the defense of non-suability if not timely asserted, Hotel, Restaurant
& Soda Fountain Employees, Local 181 v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W.2d 501 (1938);
estoppel from assertion of non-suability where the association held itself out as subject to
suit, Clark v. Grand Lodge of Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W.2d 404,
413 (1913); class actions in equity against a few members as representatives of the entire
membership, AALCO Laundry & Cleaning Co. v. Laundry Linen & Towel Chauffeurs
Union, Local 336, 115 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); or merely allowing actions against
associations without the aid of statute, Syz v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 603, 323
Mo. 130, 24 S.W.2d 1080 (1930).
' This type of statute incorporated the equity doctrine of virtual representation. Colt v.
Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N.E. 335 (1932).
8 Cole, The Civil Suability, At Law, of Labor Unions, 8 Fordham L. Rev. 29 (1939).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6133 (1925); Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. rule 28
(1941). Courts in other jurisdictions have either construed similar statutes to include labor
unions only if they are "doing business" other than merely benefitting their members, St.
Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders Union, Local 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N.W. 725
(1905), or included labor unions within the purview of the statute regardless of their ac-
tivity, Deeney v. Hotel & Apartment Clerks' Union, 57 Cal. App. 2d 1023, 134 P.2d 328
(1943).
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tutes the unincorporated association a legal entity," and that "doing
business" refers to property rights in which the membership is jointly
interested.11
Courts have adopted various theories for imposing liability on un-
incorporated associations for conduct of their members. Upon one
theory the action of the association is deemed the proximate cause of
the injury to the third party.1 Another theory considers the associa-
tion to have conspired with the member to commit the unlawful
act." By a third theory, members are agents of the association, and
the association is deemed liable for those acts of its members which
it authorizes or ratifies.' Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act"'
provides that an association is not liable for conduct of its individual
members unless it has participated in, authorized, or ratified the con-
duct. Thus, federal courts determine liability of associations for con-
duct of their members upon the third theory, i.e., the agency concept,
in cases within federal jurisdiction. However, since states are free
to determine liability of associations for conduct of their members
in cases within their exclusive jurisdicton, each state may adopt
whichever of the theories it deems desirable.' Texas courts generally
have applied the agency test in actions for money damages against
unincorporated associations for the conduct of their members."8 The
rationale behind the agency concept is that all members of the associa-
tion are co-principals, and the wrongful member is their common
agent." Accordingly, courts have disallowed recovery from the as-
sociation by one member for the negligence of another member on
the ground that one principal cannot sue his co-principal for con-
duct of the common agent."0
The court of civil appeals allowed the suit by a member against the
"Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Cook, 221 S.W. 1049 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
error ref.
" San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local 84 v. Bell, 223 S.W. 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920)
error ref.
"United States v. Railway Employees' Dep't, AFL, 283 Fed. 479 (D.C. Ill. 1922);
United Traction Co. v. Droogan, 115 Misc. 672, 189 N.Y. Supp. 39 (1921).
13 Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Retail Clerks' Ass'n, Local 424, 250 Fed. 890 (D.C.
Mo. 1918); Alaska S.S. Co. v. International Longshormmen's Ass'n, 236 Fed. 964 (D.C.
Wash. 1916).
'"Great No. Ry. v. Great Falls Lodge, IAM, 283 Fed. 557 (D.C. Mont. 1922).
"47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1946).
1'See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1946).
1
7 Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1035, 1040 (1950).
"International Printing Pressmen Union v. Smith, 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729
(1947).
"De Villars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 (1950); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 473
(1950).
"Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952); Hromek v. Gemeinde,
238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941).
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union in the principal case upon the theory adopted by federal
courts, viz., that labor unions achieve an entity status through neces-
sary implication from federal statutes." This court then held that the
member was entitled to damages on the basis of cases allowing
damages for wrongful expulsion and the Texas Right-to-Work
Law."2 The Supreme Court, however, treated the instant case solely
upon agency principles. It recognized the general rule that a mem-
ber of an unincorporated association has no cause of action against
the union for conduct of another member, but reasoned that an ex-
ception to this rule exists, viz., where the act complained of is adverse
to the interests of the injured member and is ratified by the associa-
tion."5 However, two previous Texas decisions, the Allen case" and the
Atkinson case, " had denied members recovery from their unions in
similar situations. The court in the principal case distinguished the
Allen case on the ground that it is proper to impute mere negligence
rather than willful and malicious conduct of one member to the
entire membership." The concurring opinion pointed out that the
Atkinson case, which involved intentional conduct on the part of an
agent of the union, should be overruled to the extent that it con-
tradicts the decision of the majority." At least one other jurisdiction
has utilized the reasoning of the principal case,28 which is derived
from the agency doctrine that a principal is not liable for conduct of
the agent while pursuing interests adverse to those of the principal.
If the doctrine of an agent acting adversely to his principal is
analogous to a member of an unincorporated association acting ad-
versely to the interests of another member, the principal case has
reached the correct conclusion. Moreover, if an unincorporated as-
sociation can be said to have a substantive legal entity status, e.g.,
holding property in its name as an entity which is subject to execu-
tion for association debts, the rationale of a member suing an asso-
ciation is as acceptable as a shareholder suing the corporation. Al-
though the Texas statute regarding suits against unincorporated asso-
ciations constitutes the association an entity for procedural purposes,
" Borden v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 316 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
see United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
22 Id. at 460.
22 328 S.W.2d at 742.
24Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Allen, 230 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
error ref., cert. denied, 340 U.S. 934 (1951).
" Atkinson v. Thompson, 311 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.
2' 328 S.W.2d at 744.27 Id. at 750.
2 Taxicab Drivers Local 889 v. Pittman, 322 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1957).
" Citizens State Bank v. Western Union Tel. Co., 172 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1949); 2
Mechem, Agency, § 1728 at 1311 (1914).
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it would seem that Texas law regarding substantive liability of asso-
ciations contemplates that associations, like partnerships, are nothing
more than aggregates of their individual members. The statute pro-
vides that the "joint property of all the members" rather than the
"property of the association" will be bound by judgment."0 Thus, by
permitting the plaintiff in the principal case a cause of action against
his union the court has allowed plaintiff to subject his joint property
to execution. Plaintiff is, in effect, suing himself. Admittedly, the na-
ture of a labor union is sufficiently sui generis that special rules, such
as the one in the instant case, are more appropriate than general un-
incorporated association rules. However, the court in the principal
case failed to correlate the procedural right to sue an unincorporated
association with the substantive liability of the association, i.e., as an
aggregate of its individual members rather than as a legal entity. It
would seem that the proper analogy is between a suit by a member
against his unincorporated association and a suit by a partner against
his partnership, and the rule to be applied is that one partner cannot
sue the partnership of which he is a member.
Larry M. Lesh
0 "Where suit shall be brought against such company or association, and the only serv-
ice had shall be upon the president, secretary, treasurer, or general agent of such company
or association, and judgment shall be rendered against the defendant company, such judg-
ment shall be binding on the joint property of all the stockholders or members thereof,
and may be enforced by execution against the joint property; but such judgment shall not
be binding on the individual property of the stockholders or members, nor authorize execu-
tion against it." Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6136 (1925); see Nini v. Cravens & Gage
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PROFESSOR WILMER DALLAM MASTERSON, JR.
John W. Riehmt
Professor Masterson's death created a void in the law teaching
profession that will be hard to fill, and was a great blow to his breth-
ren on this faculty. Few men possess the combined talents of good
judgment, technical mastery of a field, and teaching skill. Professor
Masterson was one of those few. To those who associated with him,
studied under him, or heard him lecture, it would serve no purpose
to repeat the record of his accomplishments; suffice it to say that
those of us who knew him best can look back to the days when he
was with us and say we had the opportunity of associating with one
of those rare individuals, a true Christian scholar.
t Dean, School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
PROFESSOR WILMER DALLAM MASTERSON, JR.
Joe E. Estest
Wilmer Dallam Masterson, Jr. was my friend-and a friend of
the bar and bench of the country. Much of his recognized merit in
the field of law, both in practicing and in teaching, stemmed from
his integrity as a human being.
Without ostentation, without pridefulness or dogmatism, he used
his fine concise mind and encyclopaedic knowledge with patience,
courteousness, frankness, and with the real generosity of a greatly
human person. He knew and practiced the objectives of court pro-
cedure-the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of litigation-
with the wisdom of broad understanding.
As a lawyer, I was in a number of cases with and against Wilmer
D. Masterson, Jr. I found him a worthy adversary and an invaluable
ally. I remember one case of tremendous consequence which went
through all the courts,' in which he had read every case in the digest
(literally hundreds) on void judgments. He had an analytical lu-
cidity about his handling of a case, which, coupled with his patience
in acquiring thorough knowledge of the controversy, fact and law,
enabled him to evaluate essentials, sift out non-essentials, and come
into court to use his rare kind of thrifty fluency in handling his case
incisively on the real issues involved. His briefs were always short,
concise-and convincing.
He never raised false issues. He was not a "brush fighter." He
stipulated uncontroverted facts, and expertly employed the discov-
ery process in getting the facts on critical issues. He abhorred vexa-
tious time consuming formalities.
His interests, however, went far beyond success as a practicing
lawyer. He was indeed a scholar-a practical scholar-who studied
the fabric of the law with the same lucid thoroughness he applied to
individual cases, saw the areas of weakness, and resultantly, Wilmer
D. Masterson, Jr. will also be remembered for having had a hand in
the improvement of the administration of justice.
As an Authority on Oil and Gas law and on Court Procedure he
appeared befdre Bar Meetings all over our state and in many others.
He was a leader of Institutes all over the country. Courts have used
his writings as a basis for decision. As an illustration, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:' "However, as
t Chief Judge, United States District Court, Northern District of Texas.
'Henderson v. Shell Oil Co., 143 Tex. 142, 182 S.W.2d 994 (1944), 146 Tex. 467,
208 S.W.2d 863, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 884 (1948).
"Haby v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 228 F.2d 298, at 300-01 (5th Cir. 1955).
to absent parties, whose property interests are not bound by the de-
cree, we agree with what has been so well stated by Professor Wilmer
D. Masterson, Jr. in his excellent article presented before the 1954
Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference:
'For centuries, courts, particularly those exercising equity jurisdic-
tion, have had and have exercised broad discretion on the matter of
parties to lawsuits. If justice would be best and most conveniently
served by having them brought in, then brought in they should be.
By the same yardstick, if justice and convenience can best be served
by limiting the controversy to that asserted by plaintiff against the
named defendant, then it should be so limited.'"
His long service as a member of the Advisory Committee of the
Texas Supreme Court on Rules of Civil Procedure attests his gen-
erosity to his profession as well as the recognition of his leadership
in the field of Procedure.
Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr. will be remembered by the legal pro-
fession, Bench and Bar alike, as a fine lawyer and scholar who con-
tributed much to the continuing development of his profession and
to the solution of problems implicit in such development; as a great
teacher who gave much to the creation of a whole generation of
practicing attorneys.
By those who were so fortunate as to know him, he will be re-
membered as a lawyer, teacher, and man of such superior quality that
all he touched reflected the greatness of the man.
PROFESSOR WILMER DALLAM MASTERSON, JR.
Board of Editors, Southwestern Law Journal
The students who have served on the staff of the Southwestern
Law Journal are greatly indebted to Professor Masterson. As student
editors, they have had the benefit of working with him in publishing
the many outstanding articles which he contributed to the Journal'
and of receiving his invaluable advice and counsel in the supervision
of student writings. As students of the law school, they have received
practical and thorough instruction in some of the most complicated
areas of the law.
As a writer, Professor Masterson possessed the rare ability of pre-
senting a complicated legal problem in an understandable manner and
suggesting a legally sound and practical solution to that problem. As
a supervisor of student writing, he spent many hours helping the
student develop those abilities of legal analysis and expression that
are essential to any lawyer. In the classroom, Professor Masterson's
patience and understanding in allowing students to question and
comment upon the concepts involved in his courses won him the deep
admiration and respect of all his students. His primary concern in
teaching was not to create legal stumbling blocks that left the stu-
dent in confusion and uncertainty, but to remove the stumbling
blocks and instill in the student a conception of the legal intricacies
of the particular subject in such a manner that they were not easily
forgotten. However, perhaps Professor Masterson's greatest asset, and
the one most beneficial to those who worked with him and were
taught by him, was his complete devotion to the law, and his constant
desire to strengthen its weaknesses and remove its contradictions. He
has earned a place in the minds and hearts of his students that will
not be replaced.
a The following Articles by Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr. have appeared in the South-
western Law Journal:
Adversary Depositions and Admissions Under Texas Practice, 10 Sw. L.J. 107 (1956);
Double Fraction Problems in Instruments Involving Mineral Interests, 11 Sw. L.J. 281
(1957);
Marital Property Problems from an Oil and Gas Lessee's Standpoint, 4 Sw. L.J. 151
(1950);
Preparation and Submission of Special Issues in Texas, 6 Sw. L.J. 163 (1952);
A Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 6 Sw. L.J. 1 (1952);
Texas Court Rule Amendments Which Will Become Effective January 1, 1955, 8
Sw. L.J. 377 (1954).
The Shut-In Royalty Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 12 Sw. L.J. 459 (1958).
